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Abstract: In this paper, a fully choice-based theory of disappointment is developed. It encompasses, as
particular cases, EU theory, Guls theory of disappointment (1991) and the models of Loomes and Sugden
(1986). According to the new theory, the risk premium of a random prospect is the sum of two premiums:
a concavity premium that is nothing but the usual Arrow-Pratt premium and a second premium that may
be identied to expected disappointment. The corresponding representing functional belongs to the class
of lottery-dependent utility models (Becker and Sarin 1987) since disappointment is the decit between the
utility of the realized outcome and its expected value. However, unlike the lottery-dependent approach, the
theory is choice-based and its axioms are experimentally testable.
JEL classication: D81
Key-words: axiomatization, disappointment aversion, random prospect, risk premium, expected utility.
Résumé : Nous proposons, dans cette étude, une axiomatisation du comportement dun individu en
univers incertain. Cette axiomatisation permet de¤ectuer une synthèse de nombreuses théories antérieures:
théorie de lutilité espérée, théorie de la déception (Gul 1991), modèles à la Loomes et Sugden (1986) ou
modèles à fonctionnelle "loterie-dépendante" (Becker and Sarin 1987). La prime de risque exigée par un
investisseur y est la somme dune prime dArrow-Pratt et dune seconde prime, égale à lespérance de la
déception. Celle-ci nest autre que la di¤érence entre la satisfaction éprouvée ex ante et lutilité espérée du
revenu aléatoire.
Classication JEL : D81
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1 Introduction
It is often emphasized, in psychological literature, that (i) disappointment (elation) is experimented, once
a decision has been taken, when the chosen option turns out to be worse (better) than expected (see, for
instance, Mellers 2000), (ii) that it is the most frequently experimented emotion (Weiner et alii 1979) and (iii)
that disappointment is the most powerful among the negative emotions that are experimented (Schimmack
and Diener 1997). There is a lot of empirical evidence that supports this view (Van Dijk and Van der
Pligt 1996, Zeelenberg et alii 2002, Van Dijk et alii 2003). Moreover, emotions are anticipated by decision
makers. As Frijda (1994) points out, actual emotion, a¤ective response, anticipation of future emotion can
be regarded as the primary source of decisions. In other words, expected elation or disappointment plays
an important role in decision making.
This role was rst formalized independently by Bell (1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1986). Despite its
earliness, their approach has revealed surprisingly close to the analyses mentioned above. Indeed, according
to Loomes and Sugden, the satisfaction experimented by an investor after a lottery has been run includes
two elements: (i) the satisfaction resulting from the ownership of the outcome that actually occurred and
(ii) elation or disappointment that depends on the di¤erence between the above satisfaction and the utility
of a reference outcome that will be called, from now on, zero-disappointment (henceforth ZD) outcome.1
Despite their psychological relevance, the models of Bell (1985) and of Loomes and Sugden (1986) have
been somewhat neglected in the economic literature, probably because they lack an axiomatic framework.
In the meantime, other disappointment models have been developed, in which elation or disappointment
is measured somewhat di¤erently; Delquie and Cillo (2006) use all the outcomes of the prospect; Jia et
alii (2001) generalize Bells (1985) approach and advocate the use of its expected value; Grant and Kajii
(1998) adapt the setting of the rank-dependent expected utility model (Quiggin 1982 among others) to
highlight the dependence on the best possible outcome. However these approaches also lack an axiomatic
basis. By contrast, Gul (1991) develops an axiomatized theory of disappointment where the ZD outcome is
the certainty equivalent of the prospect.
1Since its occurring implies neither elation nor disappointment.
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In this article, an axiomatization of decision making under risk is developed. Preferences are dened over
a set of bounded random prospects. As usual, they are assumed to be a continuous total order. Next, a
partition of the set of the random prospects is made. Each element of the partition is a subset of prospects
exhibiting the same ZD outcome. When constant marginal utility is assumed the ZD outcome coincides
with the expected outcome. In the general case, the utility of a ZD outcome is the expected utility of the
prospect. The independence axiom is set over each subset of prospects exhibiting the same ZD outcome
and a standard representation theorem is used to dene a lottery-dependent functional. The consistency of
the functionals is obtained through setting an additional axiom. The intuition is that risk premia, in the
sense of Markowitz (1952)combine linearly if the prospects that are mixed exhibit the same ZD outcome.
Finally, preferences will be represented by a functional that encompasses, as particular cases, that of EU
theory, that of Gul and that of Loomes and Sugden. Clearly, disappointment models belong to the very
general class of lottery-dependent utility models (Becker and Sarin 1987). However, unlike its predecessors
our lottery-dependent models preserve a fully choice-based approach and are testable. Indeed, the elementary
utility function that is used to dene the ZD outcome, can be elicited, and, consequently the subsets over
which the independence axiom is set, may be identied. An important part of this article is thus devoted
to the presentation of an elicitation process that can be implemented. The rest of this article is organized
as follows: rst, preferences are assumed to exhibit constant marginal utility and a simplied axiomatics is
proposed (Section 2). Next, the general case is considered (Section 3). Section 4 concludes.
2 Constant marginal utility.
2.1 The framework
From now on, we consider a set of random prospects, labelledW, whose outcomes are monetary and belong
to a bounded interval of R, say [a; b]. An element of W will be labelled ew and its cumulative distribution
function F ew (:). If a random prospect ew has a discrete support {w1; w2; :::; wK}, it will also be denominated
[w1; w2; :::; wK ; p1; p2; :::; pK ] where pk = Pr ( ew = wk). A probability mixture of ew1 2W and ew2 2 W, will
3
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be denoted  ew1  (1  ) ew2, where  belongs to [0; 1]. Binary lotteries will be labelled
eww1;w2 def= [w1; w2; 1  ; ]
where  2[0; 1]. Probability 1    () will be called the rst (second) weight of eww1;w2 . The degenerate
lottery whose outcome is w with certainty is  (w). Preferences over prospects will be denoted -, with 
(strict preference) and  (indi¤erence). The certainty equivalent of the prospect ew 2 W is labelled c ( ew),
that is ew (c ( ew)).
In Loomes and Sugden (1986), preferences are represented by the following functional:
U ( ew) def= E [u ( ew)] +E [DIS ( ew)]
where ew 2 W, U (:) maps W on to R, E [:] stands for the expectation operator, u (:) is an elementary
utility function that is a strictly increasing function mapping [a; b] on to [0; 1]and DIS (w) is elation or
disappointment when the outcome happens to be w. Elation (disappointment) is experimented if DIS (w) is
positive (negative). U ( ew) is the sum of (i) expected elementary utility that is E [u ( ew)]and (ii) expected
elation/disappointment that is E [DIS ( ew)]. In their seminal work, Loomes and Sugden (1986) set
DIS (w) = E (u (w) E [u ( ew)])
where E (:) is strictly increasing and fullls the self-explanatory condition E (0) = 0, what will be assumed
in the rest of this article. We now focus on the case when constant marginal utility is assumed. Preferences
are represented by the below functional:
U ( ew) = E [ ew] +E [E ( ew  E [ ew])] (1)
Moreover, if investors are risk averse, that is if they always demand a negative risk premium, we get the
below inequality:
8 ew 2W; E [E ( ew  E [ ew])]  0 = E [ ew  E [ ew]] (2)
that implies that function E (:) is concave, what will be assumed from now on.
If preferences are represented by (1), then the binary relation " ew1 and ew2 have the same expected value"
is clearly an equivalence relation overW, whose classes are the subsetsWz = f ew 2W jE [ ew] = zg. Any subset
4
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Wz possesses exactly one degenerate lottery  (z) and one binary lottery of the ewa;bp type. The binary lottery
will be denominated ewa;b(z) where  (z) = (z   a) = (b  a). The family of subsets fWzgz2[a;b] is endowed with
three other important properties. The rst two ones may be stated as indicated below:
Property A (extremal elements). Any element of Wz is such that: ewa;b(z)  ew   (z).2
Proof. See the Appendix.
Property B (independence). The independence property is met over any subset Wz, that is, for any
triple of prospects ( ew1; ew2; ew3) 2WzWzWz and for any real number  2 [0; 1], the following implication
holds: ew1  ew2 )  ew1  (1  ) ew3   ew2  (1  ) ew3:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Let ew (a) be the probability mixture of  (E [ ew]) and of ewa;b(E[ ew]) whose weights are (a; 1   a), that is
let ew (a) def= a (E [ ew])  (1  a) ewa;b(E[ ew]). Now, consider an arbitrary prospect ew 2 W and its certainty
equivalent c ( ew). Clearly, there exists a unique real number, a ew 2 [0; 1], that is dened by the following
equivalence : ew  ew (a ew). The third property may then be stated as follows:
Property C (consistency). The certainty equivalent of a prospect ew 2W is a convex combination the
certainty equivalents of the extremal elements of WE[ ew] whose weights are (a ew; 1  a ew). that is:
c ( ew) = a ewE [ ew] + (1  a ew) c( ewa;b(E[ ew])): (3)
Proof. From (1) we get that U ( (c ( ew))) = c ( ew), for any ew 2 W. Moreover, since ew  c ( ew) , then
U ( ew) = U ( (c ( ew))). Finally, we get:
U ( ew) = c ( ew) (4)
Next, from (1) we get that U ( ew (a ew)) expresses as:
U ( ew (a ew)) = a ewE [ ew] + (1  a ew) c( ewa;b(E[ ew])) (5)
and since U ( ew) = U ( ew (a ew)), we also get the below equality:
U ( ew) = a ewE [ ew] + (1  a ew) c( ewa;b(E[ ew])) (6)
Combining (4) and (6) yields (3). As a consequence, we set the following denition:
2Note that Property A is due to the concavity of E (:).
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Denition 1 (consistency property). Preferences are endowed with the consistency property if
Property C is met,
A graphical illustration of the consistency property is given on Figure 1. Certainty equivalents are plotted
on the horizontal axis whereas ZD outcomes, that is expected values, are plotted on the vertical axis. The
subset Wcz of prospects whose expected value is z and whose certainty equivalent is c, is represented by
point L =(c; z). The subset Wz (Wc) of prospects whose expected value is z (whose certainty equivalent is
c) is represented by the horizontal (vertical) segment whose bounds are M = (c( ewa;b(z)); z) and N = (z; z)
(Q = (c; c) and P = (c; zp) where zp is such that c( ewa;b(zp)) = c).3 Since the investor is assumed to be
risk-averse, any prospect must be plotted in the area lying between segment OB, that is the locus of the
degenerate lotteries  (c) and the curve whose points correspond the binary lotteries ewa;b(z) that is the minimal
elements of the subsets Wz. Let ew 2Wcz. From Property C, we get that:
a ew = LN
MN
=
QN
TN
; 1  a ew = ML
MN
=
TQ
TN
Insert Figure 1 about here
In the next subsection, we develop an axiomatics corresponding to investors whose preferences exhibit
constant marginal utility.
2.2 An axiomatics for disappointment models with constant marginal utility.
First, any investor will be assumed to have preferences that obey the two rst axioms of EU theory. These
two axioms are recalled below:
Axiom A1 (total ordering of ). The binary relation  is a complete weak order.
Axiom A2 (continuity of ). For any prospect ew 2W the sets {ev 2W p ev ew} and {ev 2W p ewev}
are closed in the topology of weak convergence.
Under the axioms of total ordering and continuity, there exists a numerical representation for the pref-
erence relation. It consists in a continuous utility function U(:) mapping W on to [U( (a));U( (b))]  R.
U(:) is dened up to a continuous and strictly increasing transformation. To get a stronger result, additional
axioms must be set. In EU theory, it is the independence axiom.
3Recall that (z)
def
= (z   a)=(b  a).
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By contrast, some weaker axioms will now be set. They correspond to the three last properties that were
presented above. Indeed, we need to set an axiom to get Property A. We now assume that the subset of the
prospects exhibiting the same expected value z has two extremal elements.
Axiom A3 (extremal elements) The subset Wz = f ew 2W jE [ ew] = zg has a maximal element  (z)
and a minimal element ewa;b(z), where  (z) def= (z   a) = (b  a).
Clearly, ewa;b(z) ( (z)) is the most (less) risky in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970)among the
prospects exhibiting the same expected value. Hence, the above axiom means that the less risky prospect
is preferred to the other ones and that any prospect is preferred to the most risky one. Actually, Axiom 3
is not very restrictive since a standard second-order dominance axiom can be substituted for it to get the
same result. The next axiom is the independence axiom, that is set for any subset of prospects exhibiting
the same expected value.
Axiom A4 (independence over any Wz). The independence property is met over any subset Wz:
From Axiom 4, we get the following standard result:
Proposition 1. Under Axioms A1 to A4, the weak order of preferences  may be represented over
Wz by the lottery-dependent functional Uz ( ew) def= R ba z(x)dF ew(x), where z = E [ ew] and where z (:) is
an increasing function that is dened up to an a¢ ne and positive transformation. In other words, for any
( ew1; ew2) 2Wz Wz, the following equivalence is valid:
ew1 ew2 , Z b
a
z(x)dF ew1(x) 
Z b
a
z(x)dFew2(x) (7)
Proof. Since the axioms of EU theory are valid over each subset Wz, there exists a continuous and
increasing function z(:) mapping [a; b] on to [z(a);z(b)] that numerically represents preferences overWz.
Function z(:) is dened up to a positive and a¢ ne transformation. See, for instance, Fishburn (1970).
From now on, we set the following normalization conditions:
z(c( ewa;b(z))) = c( ewa;b(z)) ; z(z) = z (8)
and z(:) is now unambiguously dened. Let us call z(:) (Uz (:) ;Uz ( ew)) the lottery-dependent elementary
utility (functional, value) of ew 2 Wz. The normalization conditions mean that the the lottery-dependent
elementary utilities of the extremal elements of Wz coincide with their certainty equivalents.4 Now, let
4The certainty equivalent of  (z) is z itself.
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ew (a) be dened according to the below denition:
ew (a) def= a (E [ ew]) (1  a) ewa;b(E[ ew]) (9)
Clearly ew (a) 2 WE[ ew]. Moreover, Axiom 2 implies that there exists a unique real number a ew 2 [0; 1]
such that ew (a ew)  ew. Next, Proposition 1 and the normalization conditions imply that
UE[ ew]( ew) = UE[ ew]( ew (a ew)) = a ewE [ ew] + (1  a ew)c( ewa;b(E[ ew]))
that is the lottery-dependent valuation of ew 2 WE[ ew], namely UE[ ew]( ew), is a convex function of those of
 (E [ ew]) and of ewa;b(E[ ew]), namely UE[ ew]( (E [ ew])) = E [ ew] and UE[ ew]( ewa;b(E[ ew])) = c( ewa;b(E[ ew])). Now consider
the certainty equivalent of ew: since  (E [ ew]) and ewa;b(E[ ew]) are the extremal elements of WE[ ew], it is a convex
combination of  (E [ ew]) and of ewa;b(E[ ew]) that is:
c ( ew) =  ewE [ ew] + (1   ew) c( ewa;b(z)): (10)
The lottery-dependent functionals will be consistent with one another if and only if their value coincides
with the that of the relevant certainty equivalent, that is if and only if a ew =  ew for any ew 2 W. Hence we
set the following axiom:
Axiom A5 (consistency). Preferences are endowed with the consistency property.
The above axiom means that the weights of the compound lottery ew (a ew) are those of the convex com-
bination the certainty equivalents of the extremal elements of WE[ ew] that is equal to c ( ew). Finally, from
Axiom 5 we get that condition (7) will also hold in the case when ew1 2Wz1 and ew2 2Wz2with z1 6= z2.
Proposition 2. Under Axioms A1 to A5, the preferences of a disappointment averse investor over W
are represented by the lottery-dependent functional:
U( ew) = Z b
a
E[ ew](x)dFew(x) (11)
where ew 2W and where z( ew)(:) is dened from Proposition 1 and the normalization conditions (8).
Proof. It is a direct consequence of Proposition 1, of the normalization conditions (8) and of the
consistency property. 
Three additional remarks must now be made: rst there exists a non-empty set of models satisfying
Axioms A1 to A5 since the functional (1) is clearly a particular case of (11).5 Last, E[ ew](x) may be
5To check that point just set E[ ew](x) = x+ E (x E [ ew])
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substituted for a+ bE[ ew](x), where a 2 R, and b 2 R+. In other words, E[ ew](:) is dened up to an a¢ ne
and positive transformation.
3 Variable marginal utility
Now what happens if variable marginal utility is assumed? Actually the above axiomatics has to be only
slightlymodied. First, since u (:) is strictly increasing Axiom 3 remains unchanged. Next, the equivalence
relation " ew1 and ew2 have the same expected value" must be substituted for: " ew1 and ew2 have the same
expected utility".
Let Wuz be dened as the subset of prospects whose expected utility is u (z), that is Wuz = { ew 2 W j
E [u ( ew)] = u (z)}, and, consequently,  (z) = u (z). The independence axiom is set on each subset Wuz . The
lottery-dependent valuation of ew is Uuz ( ew) def= R ba uz (x)dF ew(x), where z = E [ ew] and where uz (:) is, here
again, an increasing function that is dened up to an a¢ ne and positive transformation. The normalization
conditions (8) now read:
uz (c( ewa;bu(z))) = u(c( ewa;bu(z))) ; uz (z) = u (z) (12)
and, nally, the denition of the consistency property must be restated as indicated below:
Denition 2 (generalized consistency property). Preferences are endowed with the consistency
property if the weights of the utility of the compound lottery ew (a ew) are those of the convex combination
the utilities of the certainty equivalents of the extremal elements of WE[ ew] that is equal to u(c ( ew)), that is
if
u (c ( ew)) = a ewu (z) + (1  a ew)u(c( ewa;b(z))) (13)
where a ew is dened by ew (a ew)  ew.
If function u (:) is known, the so modied axiomatics may be used to get a representation of preferences
similar to (11). Indeed, the next proposition may be substituted for Propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 3. Under Axioms A1 to A4, and given that u (:) is known, the weak order of preferences
 may be represented over W by the lottery-dependent representing functional Uuz ( ew) def= R ba uz (x)dFew(x),
where z = u 1(E [u( ew)]) and where uz (:) is an increasing function that is dened up to an a¢ ne and
9
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.102 (Version révisée)
positive transformation.
If Axiom A5 is set, the preferences of a disappointment averse investor over W are represented by
the lottery-dependent functional Uu( ew) = R b
a
uz( ew)(x)dFew(x), where uz( ew)(:) is dened according to the
normalization conditions (12).
Proof. The proof is similar to those of Propositions 1 and 2.
Clearly, the above results are of interest if and only if u (:) can be elicited. To get an elicitation property
we must set an additional axiom. As a preliminary to this setting, we show that some models à la Loomes and
Sugden are endowed with such a property. Actually, we focus on the case when preferences are represented
by the below functional
U ( ew) = E [u ( ew)] +E [E (u ( ew) E [u ( ew)])]
where E (:) is strictly increasing and concave, and fullls the self-explanatory condition E (0) = 0. Although
Loomes and Sugden (1986) considered more general models, we call them LS-models.
3.1 The elicitation property of LS-models
In LS-models, the betweenness property, and, consequently, the independence axiom may be violated.
Hence, it is of interest to set the below denition.
Denition 3 (strong indi¤erence). Two prospects ew1 and ew2 are strongly indi¤erent if and only if
(a) they are indi¤erent and (b) they meet the betweenness property. The binary relation " ew1 and ew2 are
strongly indi¤erent" will be labelled " ew1  ew2".
Clearly, strong indi¤erence implies indi¤erence in the usual sense that will be called, from now on, weak
indi¤erence. An important property of LS-models is given in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. In LS-models, two prospects ew1 and ew2 are strongly indi¤erent if and only if they exhibit
the same certainty equivalent and the same ZD-outcome, what formally reads:
ew1  ew2 () c ( ew1) = c ( ew2) and z ( ew1) = z ( ew2)
Proof. It is given in the Appendix.
The above proposition makes sense because the certainty equivalent of ew 2 W now generically di¤ers
from the zero-disappointment outcome z ( ew) = u 1 (E [u ( ew)]). The binary relation  is obviously reexive
10
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and symmetric. From Proposition 4, we get that it is also transitive. Hence, it is an equivalence relation
over W. An equivalence class will be denoted Wcz = Wc \Wz where Wc = f ew 2 W j c ( ew) = cg and Wz
= f ew 2 W j z ( ew) = zg. An important property of LS-models is that each equivalence class Wcz possesses
exactly one binary lottery of the ewa;xp type and one of the ewy;b1 q type.6
Proposition 5 (strong equivalents). There exists exactly one binary lottery of the ewa;xp type (of
the ewy;b1 q type) that is strongly indi¤erent to ew. Lottery ewa;xp ( ewy;b1 q) will be called the left (right) strong
equivalent of ew. The degenerate lottery  (z) (the binary lottery ewa;bu(z)) is a maximal (minimal) element in
Wz, that is ewa;bu(z)  z   (z).
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix. The intuition behind the proof is as follows: among the ewa;xp s,
the prospects that exhibit the same expected utility u (z) are all the more valuable that the scattering of
their outcomes is more narrow. Clearly, the degenerate lottery  (z), where u (z) = pu (b)+ (1  p)u (a) = p,
is endowed with the minimal dispersion of outcomes whereas the maximal one is obtained with the discrete
distribution ewa;bu(z) = [a; b : 1  u (z) ; u (z)].
Another important property of LS-models is the elicitation property. Let w 2 [a; b] ( 2 [0; 1]) be an
arbitrary level of wealth (probability). Consider the sequence of binary lotteries labelled f ewa;xnpn gn2N that
meets the below requirements:
x0 = w; p0 =  and ewxn+1;b1 pn+1  ewa;xnpn (14)
where ewxn+1;b1 pn+1 is the right strong equivalent of ewa;xnpn . Since ewa;xnpn has exactly one right strong equivalent,
the function which is dened by the below equality:
(xn+1; pn+1) = F (xn; pn)
is one-to-one. Clearly, fxngn2N is a strictly decreasing sequence. The di¤erence between the expected
utilities of two consecutive binary lotteries, ewa;xnpn and ewa;xn+1pn+1 , is equal to the second weight (1   pn+1) of
the right strong equivalent ewxn+1;b1 pn+1 of ewa;xnpn , what formally reads:
E

u( ewa;xnpn ) E hu( ewa;xn+1pn+1 )i = 1  pn+1
6Recall that we have: ewa;xp def= [a; x ; 1  p; p] and ewy;b1 q def= [y; b ; q; 1  q] :
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consequently, the expected utility of the initial lottery that is u (w)satises the following equality:
u (w) = E

u( ewa;xnpn )+Pni=1(1  pi)
Alternatively, one may consider a sequence of binary lotteries, f ewyn;bqn gn2N, that are dened as indicated
below:
y0 = w; q0 =  and ewa;yn+1qn+1  ewyn;b1 qn (15)
and the elements of the sequence are endowed with the following property:
E
h
u( ewa;yn+1qn+1 )i E u( ewa;ynqn ) = 1  qn+1 =) u (w) = E u( ewa;ynqn ) Pni=1 (1  qi)
From now on, the sequences f ewa;xnpn gn2N and f ewyn;b1 qngn2N, will be called the canonical sequences generated
by (w; ). As shown below, they respectively converge, in LS-models, towards  (a) or  (b). The result holds
whatever the value of .
Proposition 6. Let f ewa;xnpn gn2N and f ewyn;bqn gn2N be the canonical sequences of binary lotteries generated
by (w; ) 2 ]a; b[ ]0; 1[. Then, in LS-models where investors are disappointment averse, fxngn2N (fyngn2N)
is a decreasing (increasing) sequence of real numbers converging towards a (b). The sequence f1  pngn2N
(f1  qngn2N) is increasing and converges towards ` (1 `) where ` does not depend on  and is a strictly
increasing function of w, mapping [a; b] on to [0; 1].
Proof. It is given in the Appendix.
Finally, in LS-models, we have the following equalities:
` = lim
n!1(
Pn
i=1 (1  pi))= = limn!1(1 
Pn
i=0 (1  qi))= (16)
and from now on we shall set ` = u (w). Preferences are endowed with the elicitation property, that is u (w)
can be known with as much accuracy as desired, for any outcome w 2 ]a; b[. Indeed, one may choose an
arbitrary probability  2 ]0; 1[ and build, from the answers of an investor facing lotteries of the ewa;xp type
and/or of the ewy;b1 q type, the two canonical sequences generated by (w; ). An accurate ranging of u (w)
may be obtained since we have:
Pn
i=1 (1  pi))=  u (w)  (1 
Pn
i=0 (1  qi))= (17)
Finally we shall dene the elicitation property as indicated below:
12
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Denition 4 (elicitation property). The equivalence relation  over W is endowed with the elicitation
property i¤ the canonical sequences of binary lotteries generated by an arbitrary couple of real numbers
(w; ) 2 ]a; b[ ]0; 1[ satisfy Proposition 6.
3.2 The additional axiom
Finally, before setting Axiom A3 and after having set Axiom A2, we can set the following one:
Axiom AE (elicitation property). The strong indi¤erence relation is an equivalence relation over the
set of random prospects W that is endowed with the elicitation property.
We provisionally rule out the cases when the quotient set of W by  is empty or equal to W itself. The
latter case is clearly of no interest whereas the former one corresponds to that of EU theory since strong
indi¤erence then coincides with weak indi¤erence.
Axiom AE states that the strong indi¤erence relation is endowed with the elicitation property. Hence, for
any level of wealth w, one can choose an arbitrary probability  2 [0; 1] and build two canonical sequences
f ewa;xnpn gn2N and f ewyn;b1 qngn2N, according to (14) and (15). Let (w; ) 2 [a; b]  ]0; 1[, Pn def= Pni=1 (1  pi))=
and Qn
def
= (1 Pni=0 (1  qi))=. The canonical sequences of binary lotteries generated by (w; ) converge
respectively towards  (a) and  (b) and the sequence fPngn2N (fQngn2N) converges towards a limit u (w)
that is an increasing function of w.
We now set: z ( ew) = u 1 (E [u ( ew)]) and z ( ew) will be called the ZD-outcome of ew. A particular case
occurs if, for any ew 2 W, z ( ew) = c ( ew). For ease of exposition, we provisionally rule out this particular
case. Hence, as before, we set Wcz =Wc \Wz where Wz (Wc) consists in the prospects whose ZD-outcome
(certainty equivalent) is z (c). Using the above results we may state the below proposition:
Proposition 7. Under Axioms A1 to A5 and axiom AE, the preferences of a disappointment averse
investor over W are represented by the lottery-dependent functional:
U( ew) = Z b
a
z( ew)(x)dF ew(x) (18)
where ew 2 W and where z( ew)(:) is dened according to Proposition 3 and the normalization conditions
(12).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2.
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Some additional remarks must now be made. First, note that LS-models satisfy Axioms A1 to A5 and
Axiom AE. Hence, setting these axioms does not lead to an empty set of models. In other words, one may
be sure that the axiomatization makes sense. Next, note that the new axioms are, at least in principle,
experimentally testable since their checking comes down to making choices between binary loteries. The
number of experiments obviously depends on the desired accuracy of the elementary utility function u(:).
The third remark is that EU theory is a degenerate case of the above disappointment theory. It corresponds
to the case that was provisionally ruled out at the beginning of the section. In EU theory, strong indi¤erence
and weak indi¤erence coincide and the independence property is met over W.
3.3 A review of some early disappointment models
We now go back to some early lottery-dependent utility models (henceforth LDU-models).
3.3.1 Back to LDU-models (Becker and Sarin 1987 and Schmidt 2001)
The preference functional of a LDU-model reads:7
ULDU ( ew) =PKk=1 pkv (h( ew); wk) (19)
where v [:; :] is a function dened over [a; b]R+ and whose values belong to [0; 1] and where h( ew) is a
function dened over W and whose values belong to R.
The functional (19) may be derived from three axioms that have been provided by Becker and Sarin
(1987): total ordering, continuity and monotonicity. Their rst two axioms are those of EU theory and
the third one is but the stochastic dominance principle. However, as pointed out by Starmer (2000) "the
basic model is conventional theory for minimalists as, without further restriction, it has virtually no empirical
content."8 Finally, almost any non-EU model can be viewed as a LDU-model, once an appropriate functional
form of v (:; :) has been chosen. According to Becker and Sarin, a LDU-model may be particularized in the
following way: one may assess h ( ew) to be linear with respect to the probabilities pk, that one may set
7For ease of exposition, we focus on discrete prospects.
8Starmer: Developments in Non Expected Utility Theory, JEL, p. 345.
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h( ew) =PKk=1 hkpk and dene a function H (:) such that H (wk) = hk. Actually, the authors set:
h( ew) =PKk=1H (wk) pk = E [H [ ew]] (20)
and the new model then belongs to a subset of LDU-models called lottery-dependent expected utility models
(henceforth LDEU-models). The functions h(:) and/or H (:), may be chosen arbitrarily but they have to
be specied before testable implications of the model be derived. As a consequence, LDEU-models are not
choice-based.
Schmidt (2001) considers somewhat more general models called lottery-dependent convex utility models
(henceforth LDCU-models). A condition less restrictive than (20) is fullled by LDCU-models. It reads:
h( ewi) =  and i  0 and PNi=1 i = 1) hPNi=1 i ewi =  (21)
Four axioms are necessary to develop this class of models. The rst two axioms (total ordering and
continuity) are, again, those of EU theory. The author then substitutes for the independence axiom two
new axioms: the rst one, called the lottery dependent independence axiom, states that the independence
property is met over any subsetW of prospects fullling (21). To derive LDCU-models, the author considers
the functionals U( ew) that satisfy the above axiom that are linear in every subsetW for all . A linear U(:)
is obtained if and only if there exists a sequence of functions f';  2 [U( (a));U( (b))]g where ' : R!R+
is continuous and strictly increasing so that:
8 2 [U( (a));U( (b))] , U( ew) = ' [u ( ew)] if ew 2W
This result is guaranteed by an additional axiom that enables the author to select one particular function
U(:) from all the candidates. Here again, function h(:) may be chosen arbitrarily and has to be specied
before testable implications of the model be derived. As a consequence, LDCU-models are not choice-based.9
3.3.2 Other examples
LS-models constitute a subset of disappointment models. Indeed, if we set:
z( ew)(x) = u (x) + E (u (x)  u(z ( ew))) ; u(z ( ew)) = E [u( ew)]
9Finally, as most of the models deriving from non-EU theories, our models clearly belong to the LDU class of models.
Nevertheless, they are neither included in the subset of LDEU-models nor in that of LDCU-models. Symmetrically, they
include neither all the models of the LDEU type nor all the models of the LDCU type.
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we get:
U ( ew) def= Z b
a
z( ew)(x)dFew (x) = u (z ( ew)) + Z b
a
E (u (x)  u(z ( ew))))dF ew (x)
and the representing functional well coincides with (18). Hence, our axiomatization can be viewed as ground-
ing the model of Loomes and Sugden. To make apparent the potential of these models for management ap-
plications, we now highlight a particular case of (11) that we call the disappointment weighted utility model.
It is obtained by putting the following restrictions on function z( ew)(:):
z(w) = u(w) [1 A (u(w)  u (z))]
where u(:) is a standard utility function and A a positive parameter that controls for disappointment aversion.
The preference functional then reads:
U ( ew) = Z b
a
u(x) [1 A (u(x) E [u( ew)])] dF ew(x) (22)
The above equation can be rewritten to show that the investors satisfaction U ( ew) can be expressed as
the sum of a standard von Neumann and Morgenstern (henceforth VNM) utility and of a penalty that is
equal to the covariance between the utility of the lottery and the disappointment premium, that is:
U ( ew) = E [u( ew)]  COV [u( ew); A  (u( ew) E [u( ew)])] = E [u( ew)] A  V ar [u( ew)] (23)
Such a result is connected with Allaisconjecture. Indeed Allais (1979) argued that a positive theory of
choice should contain two basics elements: (i) the existence of a cardinal utility function that is independent
of risk attitudes and (ii) a valuation functional of risky lotteries that depends on the second moment of the
probability distribution of uncertain utility. In EU theory, only the rst moment is relevant to determine
the attitude towards risk. By contrast, in this setting, risk attitudes are determined by the second moment
of the probability distribution of utility as in Allaistheory.
Another example of disappointment model is the descriptive model provided by Jia et alii (2001). It
generalizes Bells (1985) approach by considering the expected value of the lottery as the reference point for
measuring disappointment. Their representing functional can be expressed as:
U ( ew) = Z b
a
(1 + c1[x<E( ew)]   d1[x>E( ew)])xdF ew(x) (24)
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where c and d are two positive parameters. The above functional is, here again, a particular case of (11).
To see this point, just set:
u (x) = x ; z ( ew) = E ( ew) ; E( ew) (x) = (1 + c1[x<E( ew)]   d1[x>E( ew)])x
3.3.3 Generalization
An alternative point of view may be selected. Recall that Gul (1991) argues that elation/disappointment
should depend on the di¤erence between the certainty equivalent of a random prospect that is the price
the investor is willing to payand the actual outcome. Following Gul, we now allow for the case when the
utility of the ZD-outcome of the prospect is a convex combination of the elementary utility of the prospect
and of that of its certainty equivalent. We get:
z ( ew) def= u 1 (u ( ew) + (1  )u (c ( ew))) (25)
where  2 [0; 1], is an arbitrary scalar. Now what happens if  ! 0? The consistency property is met over
subsets whose certainty equivalent is the same. This is precisely the case that was ruled out at the beginning
of subsection 3.2. It encompasses Guls theory, since Guls representing functional reads:
U ( ew) = u(c ( ew)) = Z b
a
c( ew)(x)dF ew (x) =
Z b
a
1 + 1[x<c( ew)]
1 + E[1[x<c( ew)]]u(x)dF ew (x)
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, a fully choice-based theory of disappointment has been developed that can be viewed as
an axiomatic foundation of LS-models. The axiomatization has been grounded on works by psychologists,
showing that anticipatory emotions, and in particular disappointment, play an important role in decision
making. The axiomatic model is general enough to encompass as particular cases the models of Loomes and
Sugden and that of Gul (1991). It allows for violations of betweenness. Moreover, the reference point for
measuring disappointment, namely the ZD outcome, may di¤er from the certainty equivalent of the prospect
under review.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Proofs
Proof of Property A.
From (2) we get that the risk premium of ew is positive, or, equivalently, that the di¤erence between the
certainty equivalent of ew and that of z is negative. Hence ew   (z).
The next step of the proof consists in showing that any random prospect ew 2 Wz is preferred to ewa;bz .
Let 
def
= u (z); by denition, we have:
U( ewa;bu(z)) =  + E (1  ) + (1  ) E ( )
and, using a Taylors expansion gives:
U( ewa;bu(z)) =  +  (E ( ) + E 0 (   )) + (1  ) E ( ) =  + E ( ) + E 0 (   )
where  2 ]0; 1[. Now U( ew) expresses as:
U( ew) =  +PNn=1 pnE (u (wn)  )
=  +
PN
n=1 pn (E ( ) + u (wn) E 0 (&nu (wn)  ))
=  + E ( ) +PNn=1 pnu (wn) E 0 (&nu (wn)  )
Moreover, since 1 > u (wn) and that E (:) is concave, the inequality  > &nu (wn) holds, and so does the
next one: E 0 (&nu (wn)  ) > E 0 (   ). Finally, we get that U( ewa;bu(z)) < U( ew) or, equivalently, ewa;bu(z)  ew.
Proof of Property B.
Consider three random prospects ew1, ew2 and ew3 exhibiting the same ZD-outcome z. We get, for i = 1; 2; 3:
U ( ewi) = E [ ewi] +E [E ( ewi  E [ ewi])] = z +E [E ( ewi   z)]
that implies that:
U ( ew1)  U ( ew2) = E [E( ew1   z)] E [E ( ew2   z)]
hence if we set:
ewi =  ewi  (1  ) ew3
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we get, for i = 1; 2:
E [ ewi ] = E [ ewi] + (1  )E [ ew3] = z + (1  ) z = z
and, consequently:
U ( ewi ) = z +E [E ( ewi   z)] = u (z) + E [E ( ewi   z)] + (1  )E [E ( ew3   z)]
Finally, the di¤erence U ( ew1)  U ( ew2) comes down to:
U ( ew1)  U ( ew2) =  fE [E ( ew1   z)] E [E ( ew2   z)]g =  (U ( ew1)  U ( ew2))
Hence the sign of U ( ew1)  U ( ew2) is that of U ( ew1)  U ( ew2) :
Proof of Proposition 4.
The rst part of the proof consists in proving that if the two indi¤erent prospects ew1 and ew2 have the
same ZD-outcome z and the same certainty equivalent c, then they are strongly indi¤erent. Let ew1 and ew2
exhibit the same ZD-outcome z and the same certainty equivalent c. We have, for i = 1; 2:
u (c) = u (z) +
PN
n=1 p
i
n (E (u (wn)  u (z))) (26)
and, consequently: PN
n=1 p
1
nE (u (wn)  u (z)) 
PN
n=1 p
2
nE (u (wn)  u (z)) = 0 (27)
where ewi = w1; :::; wN ; pi1; :::; piN (i = 1; 2). Consider the compound lottery  ew1  (1  ) ew2 = ew. Its
ZD-outcome is also equal to z since its expected elementary utility is u (z) = u (z) + (1  )u (z). Hence,
we get:
u (c ( ew)) = u (z) +PNn=1  p1n + (1  ) p2n E (u (wn)  u (z))
where c ( ew) is the certainty equivalent of ew. Finally we get:
u (c ( ew))  u (c) = PNn=1 p1nE (u (wn)  u (z)) PNn=1 p2nE (u (wn)  u (z)) = 0
The proof of the converse is now given. Consider two discrete prospects:
ewi = w1; :::; wN ; pi1; :::; piN i = 1; 2
and their probability mixture:
 ew1  (1  ) ew2 = w1; :::; wN ; p11 + (1  ) p21; :::; p1N + (1  ) p2N
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where  2 [0; 1]. We must show that if ew1 and ew2 are strongly indi¤erent that is if they have the same
certainty equivalent and if they exhibit the betweenness property, then they share the same ZD-outcome.
We have, for i = 1; 2:
u (c) = u (c ( ewi)) = u (zi) +PNn=1 pinE  uin
where:
u (zi) =
PN
n=1 p
i
nu (wn) and u
i
n = u (wn)  u (zi) (28)
By denition, we have:
u (c ( ew1  (1  ) ew2)) = u (z1 + (1  ) z2) +PNn=1 p1n + (1  ) p2n E  u1n + (1  )u2n
and, since u (z1 + (1  ) z2) = u (z1) + (1  )u (z2) (see (28)), we get:
u (c ( ew1  (1  ) ew2)) = u (z1) + (1  )u (z2) +PNn=1 p1n + (1  ) p2n E  u1n + (1  )u2n
Now, from (26), we get:
u (c ( ew1)) + (1  )u (c ( ew2)) = u (z1) + (1  )u (z2) +PNn=1 p1nE  u1n+PNn=1 (1  ) p2nE  u2n
Substracting the above equation from the previous one and using the betweenness property yields:
PN
n=1 p
1
nE
 
u1n

+
PN
n=1 p
2
n (1  ) E
 
u2n

= 
PN
n=1 p
1
nE
 
u1n + (1  )u2n

+(1  )
PN
n=1 p
2
nE
 
u1n + (1  )u2n

or:

PN
n=1 p
1
n
E  u1n  E  u1n + (1  )u2n+ (1  )PNn=1 p2n E  u2n  E  u1n + (1  )u2n = 0
or, using a Taylors expansion of E (:) around u1n + (1  )u2n:
0 = 
PN
n=1 p
1
n (1  )
 
u1n   u2n
 E 0  u1n + (1  )u2n + n  u1n   u2n
+(1  )PNn=1 p2n  u1n   u2n E 0  u1n + (1  )u2n + n  u2n   u1n
where n 2 ]0; 1[ and n 2 ]0; 1[. Since u1n   u2n = u (z2)   u (z1), the above equality is equivalent to the
following one:
(u (z2)  u (z1))
hPN
n=1 p
1
nE 0 (u (wn)  un) 
PN
n=1 p
2
nE 0 (u (wn)  u2 )
i
= 0 (29)
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where un =  (1 + 

n)u (z1)+ ((1  ) n)u (z2) and u2 = (1  + n)u (z2)+ (1  n)u (z1). Since
the quantity between brackets is not identically zero, (29) implies z1 = z2:
Proof of Proposition 5.
We now prove that if ew 2Wz, there exists exactly one binary lottery ewa;xp that is strongly indi¤erent to
ew. Recall that, by denition, we have:
U   ewa;xp  = pu (x) + pE (u (x) (1  p)) + (1  p) E ( pu (x))
and, once u (x) has been substituted for u (z) =p, we get:
U   ewa;xp  = z+ pE zp   z

+ (1  p) E ( z)
where z= u (z). We get:
dU   ewa;xp 
dp
= E

z
p
  z

  E ( z) + pE 0

z
p
  z

  z
p2

=
z
p

E 0


z
p
  z

  E 0

z
p
  z

where  2 ]0; 1[. Since E (:) is strictly concave, then E 0 (:) is strictly decreasing and the quantity between
brackets in the above equation is strictly positive. Hence U   ewa;xp  can be viewed, when the expected utility
of ewa;xp is held constant, as a strictly increasing function of p mapping [0; 1], on to [U( ewa;bu(z));U ( ewa;z1 )]
where U ( ewa;z1 ) = u (z) and U( ewa;bu(z)) = u (z) + u (z) E (1  u (z)) + (1  u (z)) E ( u (z)). Hence, since
ewa;bu(z)  ew   (z), there exists exactly one binary lottery ewa;xp that is strongly indi¤erent to ew.
Proof of Proposition 6.
If xn+1 were greater than xn, ewxn+1;b1 pn+1 would exhibit rst-order stochastic dominance over ewa;xnpn . Hence,
xn+1 is lower than xn and fxngn2N is a decreasing sequence. It is also bounded below by a. Consequently, it
converges towards a limit `  a. Next, note that the two strongly indi¤erent lotteries ewa;xnpn and ewxn+1;b1 pn+1have
the same expected utility, that is, we have:
pnu (xn) = pn+1u (xn+1) + (1  pn+1) for n = 0; 1; ::: (30)
and summing the members of the above equalities yields:
u (w) = pnu (xn) +
Pn
i=1 (1  pi) for n = 1; 2; :::
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The above equality implies Sn
def
=
Pn
i=1 (1  pi)  u (w). SincefSngn2N is an increasing sequence, it
converges towards a limit   u (w). As a consequence, Sn   Sn 1 = (1  pn:) ! 0, that is pn: ! 1.
Moreover, since we have: ewa;xn+1pn+1  ewxn+1;b1 pn+1  ewa;xnpn , the sequence of binary lotteries  ewa;xnpn 	n2N is
decreasing and converges towards ewa;l1 =  (l). Similarly, f ewxn;b1 pngn2N converges towards ewl;b0 =  (l).
We now show that ` = a. The proof is by contradiction. To see this, assume ` > a. Then, since
ewa;xnpn   (l), there exists a binary lottery ewa;xnpn such that l < xn < xn, and ewa;xnpn   (l). Let xn+1 and
pn+1 be dened by ewxn+1;b1 pn+1  ewa;xnpn . Since f ewxn;b1 pngn2N converges towards  (l), there exists an integer
N , such that m  N ) l  xm < xn+1 and pm  pn+1. This implies that ewxn+1;b1 pn+1 is preferred to the
ewxm;b1 pms and, consequently, that  (l) is preferred to the ewxm;b1 pms, that contradicts the fact that f ewxn;b1 pngn2N
is decreasing and converges towards  (l). Hence ` = a and fSngn2N converges towards  = u (w). As a
consequence, equality (16) is checked.
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